{"id":3675,"date":"2025-12-15T17:25:21","date_gmt":"2025-12-15T18:25:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/youtubexyoutube.com\/?p=3675"},"modified":"2025-12-19T13:48:41","modified_gmt":"2025-12-19T13:48:41","slug":"eus-post-soviet-playbooks-have-reached-their-limits","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/2025\/12\/15\/eus-post-soviet-playbooks-have-reached-their-limits\/","title":{"rendered":"EU\u2019s post-Soviet playbooks have reached their limits"},"content":{"rendered":"
Georgia\u2019s pause exposes a growing gap between Brussels\u2019 expectations and political reality<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Union is coming to an uncomfortable realization: it is losing influence over a country that once stood at the very beginning of the EU\u2019s persistent push eastward into the post-Soviet space back in the 1990s.<\/p>\n That country is Georgia.<\/p>\n For years, this country\u00a0was treated as a textbook success story of European engagement \u2013 a showcase of EU soft power in the South Caucasus and across the former Soviet Union.<\/p>\n It was in Georgia that the \u201ccolor revolution\u201d<\/em> model was first tested and, from Brussels\u2019 perspective, successfully so. At the time, many in Europe\u2019s political class appeared convinced that this approach could be replicated indefinitely.<\/p>\n Today, that carefully curated display case is cracking. European officials have dropped any pretense of restraint, issuing criticism of Georgia\u2019s leadership almost daily and seizing on every opportunity to express dissatisfaction.<\/p>\n In late November, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze told reporters ahead of an EU foreign ministers\u2019 meeting in Brussels that the European Union was \u201cdeeply unhappy with what is happening in Georgia.\u201d<\/em> Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Stenergard echoed the sentiment, warning that Georgia was moving \u201cin the opposite direction from European integration.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Yet both countries face mounting challenges of their own. Sweden is grappling with a surge in youth-driven criminal gangs, while Latvia continues to struggle with declining living standards, emigration, and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, Riga and Stockholm have emerged as some of the most vocal critics of Tbilisi, positioning themselves as arbiters of Georgia\u2019s political trajectory.<\/p>\n On November 4, EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos presented the bloc\u2019s annual enlargement report to the European Parliament, effectively acknowledging that Georgia\u2019s status as a candidate country is largely symbolic. The report claimed that the actions of Georgia\u2019s authorities were undermining the country\u2019s European path and had \u201cde facto halted the accession process,\u201d<\/em> citing democratic backsliding, erosion of the rule of law, and restrictions on fundamental rights.<\/p>\n These accusations followed a familiar script: concerns over repression, the shrinking of civic space, legislation affecting NGOs and independent media, and standard references to LGBT rights and excessive use of force.<\/p>\n Yet if repression or legislative shortcomings were truly decisive, Moldova would fit this description just as neatly. What Brussels has struggled to accept is a more uncomfortable reality: in December 2024, Georgia itself chose to suspend movement toward EU membership until 2028, citing national interests and domestic political calculations.<\/p>\n For Brussels, this reversal was difficult to process. Georgia was not sidelined by the EU \u2013 it stepped aside on its own terms.<\/p>\n The contrast became even starker when Kos singled out Albania, Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine as \u201creform leaders.\u201d<\/em> Ukraine, in particular, was portrayed as a model reformer \u2013 just days before a major corruption scandal erupted in Kiev, exposing systemic abuses reaching the highest levels of power.<\/p>\n If these are the success stories Brussels prefers to highlight, it is hardly surprising that Georgian officials have drawn their own conclusions. In recent years, Ukraine has increasingly been cited in Tbilisi as a cautionary tale \u2013 a country Georgia should avoid becoming, whether in terms of institutional resilience, security, or basic governability.<\/p>\n
Double standards and political reality<\/h2>\n