{"id":5877,"date":"2026-05-21T16:17:16","date_gmt":"2026-05-21T16:17:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/youtubexyoutube.com\/?p=5877"},"modified":"2026-05-22T13:50:43","modified_gmt":"2026-05-22T13:50:43","slug":"ukraine-and-the-road-to-ruin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/2026\/05\/21\/ukraine-and-the-road-to-ruin\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine and the road to ruin"},"content":{"rendered":"
The fate of the conflict, part 1: The state that forgot how to live without war<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/strong>2025 can be seen as the year in which the united anti-Russian coalition fell apart. In essence, there are now three distinct players acting against Russia (Ukraine, Europe, the US), and each has its own interests. Analyst Sergey Poletaev has prepared a series of articles in which he analyses the position of each player, their goals and interests in the conflict, and suggests how Russia might respond.\u00a0<\/p>\n The first one concerns Ukraine.<\/p>\n One of the scenarios long under consideration is the gradual disintegration of the Ukrainian state, turning it into a sort of Gaza on the Dnieper. As time goes on, the likelihood of this scenario is growing, so let\u2019s examine exactly what it entails.<\/p>\n A fully-fledged state possesses an instinct for self-preservation. Apart from heart-warming victories over enemies, a state always has a host of concerns: the economy, demographics, infrastructure, the social sphere, and so on. By definition, a state is a superstructure built upon society, and, one way or another, it wages wars for the sake of the common good. Yet while at war, a state is always thinking about how it will survive afterwards and indeed, it\u2019s forced to think of things like this.\u00a0<\/p>\n \n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n If, however, the state becomes detached from society for whatever reason, it transforms into a military organization whose sole raison d\u2019\u00eatre becomes conflict. In such cases, any ideological goals may be proclaimed: a global caliphate or victory over colonial oppression, the defense of European civilization or driving the Zionists into the sea. It doesn\u2019t really matter.<\/p>\n What matters is that even when such an organization controls a certain territory and is therefore compelled to perform state and public functions there, when faced with a choice between these functions and its own military needs, it will always choose the latter.<\/p>\n For the state, people are a resource for its own reproduction and development. For a military organization, people are a resource for war: in the form of fighters and human shields.<\/p>\n It\u2019s possible to negotiate with a state. Before a war, one can threaten it, stage military maneuvers and drills, while at the same time offering various incentives. This approach works because a state considers the consequences. During a war, a state also weighs up the pros and cons and, as a rule, knows when to stop.\u00a0<\/p>\n Let\u2019s be clear: we\u2019re not talking about unique wars like the Eastern Front in the Second World War, where the only possible outcome was the annihilation of one side. We\u2019re talking about typical, classic wars, the aim of which is to use force to influence the policies of the opposing power, for it accept the victor\u2019s terms, but not to kill to the last man.<\/p>\n Such wars continue until it becomes easier for the losing side to accept the terms than to continue fighting. It\u2019s easier to adjust policy than to lose lives. It\u2019s easier to pay reparations than to cripple the economy. It\u2019s easier to cede territory than to forfeit one\u2019s future prospects.<\/p>\n A militant organization, especially one supplied from abroad, has nothing to lose. It will continue to operate as long as its ideals remain alive and there are sufficient resources to keep the fight going. It can be driven underground, but it will sprout from there like a weed.<\/p>\n Ukraine currently finds itself somewhere halfway between a state and a militant organization, which will inevitably evolve into a terrorist group. State functions are being carried out in the country, but only thanks to external funding. The non-war-related economy has virtually disappeared, and industry has fallen to a minimum due to energy shortages. More and more people are becoming alienated from the state, and the further things go, the fewer alternatives there are: either you integrate yourself into the military hierarchy in one way or another, or you find a way to flee the country, or you languish in poverty.<\/p>\n Consequently, Ukraine is becoming increasingly detached, not yet from the land itself, but from the people who inhabit that land. It is increasingly subordinating itself to the aims of war, and in so doing is losing the hallmarks of statehood. As long as the front holds more or less, this process isn\u2019t obvious: from the outside, it seems that Ukraine is united and steadfast, just as it was on the first day of the special military operation. But the further we go, the more only a shell remains of pre-war Ukraine: transit military logistics, the bureaucratic and financial superstructures serving it, semi-artisanal basement-level military production (such as assembling drones from Chinese components), rear services and, most importantly, the front line, the collapse of which will bring everything else to an end within a matter of weeks.<\/p>\n \n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s generally assumed that following the collapse of its defenses (or in the face of imminent collapse), Ukraine will have to agree to peace on Russia\u2019s terms in order to preserve its statehood. However, for this to happen, the necessary forces must be found within the Ukrainian elite. The further we go, the less hope there is for this: as the creeping disintegration of the state continues, the authorities in Kiev have less and less reason to think about the future, the welfare of their own people, the economy and so on.<\/p>\n It seems the turning point came last autumn. Whereas previously Kiev had seriously hoped for a ceasefire in exchange for Western (primarily American) security guarantees, after the Anchorage summit it came to terms with the fact that this was a pipe dream and bit the bullet. In October 2025, Vladimir Zelensky stated at a meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: Ukraine is prepared to fight for another two or three years (and ten, if necessary). For what? In fact, this is no secret. Ukraine has two options left: either endless war, or, if it manages somehow to force Russia into a ceasefire, accelerated militarization and preparations for a new war. If they manage to drag Western European troops onto Ukrainian territory, it\u2019s excellent for them; if not, they\u2019re ready to take their revenge without them.<\/p>\n The rest of the rhetoric has changed accordingly. Ukrainian children, even those in nurseries, must prepare for war. All Ukrainian men, and in principle women too, must go and fight. There is widespread discussion of lifting exemptions for students, critical infrastructure workers (including energy workers who desperately saved Ukrainian cities from freezing this winter), even doctors, and so on. Of course, this is linked to the acute shortage of personnel at the front, but the main point is that general mobilization, which was previously regarded as a temporary anomaly, is now being accepted as the new norm and is set to become even more widespread and permanent.<\/p>\n This is precisely how the Ukrainian state envisions its future; and this is what constitutes Ukraine\u2019s transformation into a vast Gaza, or, if you will, into a second Ruin (following the example of the first Ruin, the period at the end of the 17th century when the then Hetmanate Ukraine fell into general decline, followed by its piecemeal absorption by its neighbors).<\/p>\n This doesn\u2019t mean that Ukraine\u00a0will be able to secure such a future for itself.\u00a0By isolating itself from society, Kiev\u00a0is losing its social base. The tighter the ranks of the fanatics, the more frenzied their slogans, the fewer of them there are. A combat organization is suitable for irregular operations, but to hold a front line stretching 1,500 kilometers, a complex and powerful state apparatus is required. Despite Western supplies, the Ukrainian army is facing a critical shortage of everything, from personnel to food.<\/p>\n A squadron of drone operators with Starlink isn\u2019t an army. In a war of attrition, offensive operations must be conducted, yet the Ukrainian Armed Forces are de facto deprived of this capability. All they are currently capable of is a series of counter-attacks on one or two fronts, lasting no more than two or three weeks. Meanwhile, modern warfare dictates that for an offensive to succeed, one must painstakingly wear down a particular section of the front over weeks, or even months, exhausting the defenses, before seeping through the enemy\u2019s ranks and forcing them to retreat with losses.<\/p>\nThe untamed lands<\/h2>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Kostiantyn Liberov\/Libkos\/Getty Images <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nUp the staircase leading down<\/strong><\/h2>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Kostiantyn Liberov\/Libkos\/Getty Images <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nA terrible end<\/strong><\/h2>\n